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Marleen Renders1 
 
Appropriate ‘governance-technology’? – Somali clan 
elders and institutions in the making of the ‘Republic   
of Somaliland’ 
 
 
Summary 
 
Can informal ‘traditional’ institutions help to build more legitimate, ac-
countable and efficient states and governance? This article aims to con-
tribute to that emerging discussion by unraveling the story of ‘Somali-
land’, a self-declared independent republic which seceded from civil war-
ridden Somalia in 1991. The Somaliland secession seems to have been in-
stigated by ‘traditional’ clan leaders. The clan leaders were also responsi-
ble for several instances of political reconciliation between groups compet-
ing for power and resources in the region. The political weight of these 
clan leaders in the new polity had important repercussions for its institu-
tional make-up. Somaliland started out as a clan-based politico-institu-
tional arrangement, with an important role for ‘traditional’ clan leaders, 
albeit in a ‘modern’ framework: a ‘state’. The article examines the dynamic 
between these ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ components and the evolution it 
underwent from Somaliland’s declaration of independence in 1991 to 2007. 
It will discuss ways and means in which ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ institu-
tions and personnel co-exist, overlap and become reinvented in the context 
of political competition in the newly founded ‘state’.  
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tate-building in Africa is back on the agenda. After a spell of apparent 
consensus on the need for ‘minimal states’ in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the new meta-narrative in international development prescribes sound state 
                                            
1 I would like to thank the Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development, members of 
the Horn of Africa Study Group (HOASG) and two anonymous reviewers for their support 
and/or feedback on earlier versions of this article. Any errors and misjudgements that re-
main are entirely my own. 
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making and institution building as a precondition for market-led economic 
development (Maxwell 2005: 7). State- and institution-building in Africa, 
however, represent a serious headache to international policy makers. Ever 
since colonial times, imported formal institutions associated with Western 
conceptions of the state seemed to struggle with a lack of legitimacy, ac-
countability, transparency and efficiency. Moreover, often their functioning 
appears to be compromised by informal (‘traditional’ or ‘customary’) institu-
tions. Consequently, these informal institutions have long been considered as 
remnants of pre-modern times standing in the way of developmental pro-
gress. Today, however, informal institutions are beginning to attract the in-
terest of the international policymakers who have worked so zealously to 
discard them. This is reflected in new policy research by big international 
players such as the World Bank and OECD’s Development Assistance Com-
mittee (DAC), which have started to investigate African informal institutions 
in a different light (e.g. Dia 1997, Chirayath et al. 2005, Jütting et al. 2007). In-
formal institutions are no longer simply dismissed as ‘obstacles’. They may 
just become ‘opportunities’ or even ‘tools’, potentially useful in fostering 
good governance and in ‘fixing’ faulty markets and states. This new thinking 
in terms of policy seems to have been inspired by the numerous instances of 
academic research analysing the causes, effects and cures of so-called ‘failed 
states’ (e.g. Zartman 1995, Chabal/Daloz 1999, or Herbst 2000). As pointed 
out by Keyd and Buur (2006: 2) the resurgence of informal institutions, in 
particular the political rise of ‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ chiefs, can to an im-
portant extent be attributed to the the conditions underpinning failed states, 
notably those referring to conditions of unsuccessful nation-building and in-
ternal conflict. In instances where the state lost control over its citizens (or 
failed to establish control in the first place), informal ‘traditional’ authority 
structures have filled the gap. In some cases, African governments have 
turned the outcome of a ‘failed’ (or ‘weak’) state into a means of coming to 
terms with it, resulting in various degrees of what Keyd and Buur have 
called ‘re-traditionalisation’ (Keyd/Buur 2006; Skalnìk 2004).2 This strategy 
also appears to appeal to international development policy makers. 
Can informal ‘traditional’ institutions indeed help to build more legiti-
mate, accountable and efficient states and governance? If formal institutions 
are absent, do not work well or lack popular acceptance, could informal insti-
                                            
2 For example, ‘traditional’ leaders have officially been (re)incorporated in state hierarchies 
in Ghana, South-Africa, Mozambique, Uganda, Zambia, Namibia, Cameroon and Niger. In 
other cases they have been sucessful in expanding their authority informally (Keyd and 
Buur 2006 : 2). See also Buur L./Keyd H.M. (eds.) (forthcoming) State recognition and democ-
ratization in Sub-Saharan Africa. A new dawn for traditional authorities? New York: Palgrave as 
well as Vaughan O. (ed.) 2005: Tradition and politics. Indigenous political structures in Africa. 
Trenton/Asmara: Africa World Press. 
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tutions be used as ‘patches’ to repair them and help them function according 
to the donors’ standards? This article aims to contribute to that emerging dis-
cussion by unravelling the story of ‘Somaliland’, an instance of endogenous 
state-building where informal institutions appear to have played a promi-
nent part. Somaliland counts as a successful case of African state-building. 
Since Somalia’s state collapse of 1991 the south of Somalia and the capital 
Mogadishu have sunk into a desperate quagmire of lawlessness and violent 
politico-economic competition, while the hitherto unrecognized Republic of 
Somaliland ‘looks, smells and tastes like a state’ (Bryden 2003). Since 1993, it 
boasts a functioning government with a president, a cabinet of ministers, a 
bi-cameral parliament, a national judiciary and a national army. Somaliland 
claims a territory, enacts laws, raises taxes and has even managed to organise 
three democratic elections: that were local (2002), presidential (2003), and 
parliamentary (2005). All has been achieved without international political 
interference and with only extremely modest technical or financial assistance. 
When asking in Somaliland’s capital Hargeysa how this has become possible 
and what makes Somaliland different from Southern Somalia, the reply will 
almost invariably amount to: ‘the clan elders have been of crucial impor-
tance’. Indeed, in the process that has led to the emergence of the new polity, 
‘informal’ institutions – or more specifically: the institutions associated with 
the Somali clan-system – have been highly visible. 
This article is based on fieldwork carried out in Somaliland between 
March 2002 and May 2003.3 It presents a discussion of the process leading 
towards the consolidation of the new polity and an analysis of its current na-
ture. Looking at the case of Somaliland it will become clear that neither in-
formal nor formal institutions are ‘empty’ of-political elements. They are part 
of a larger political process. In that process, formal and informal actors and 
institutional ‘spheres’ overlap, co-operate and compete. Borders between the 
                                            
3 During the course of fieldwork, I worked as a research fellow with the Somaliland Acad-
emy for Peace and Development, a local organisation practising ‘participatory action re-
search’. All SAPD’s staff are Somali researchers engaging both in reseach into political rec-
onciliation as well as in actual reconciliation efforts as such. They have generously shared 
their insights, information and networks which allowed me to conduct a large number of 
interviews in various towns and regions of Somaliland ( including Hargeysa, Gabiley, Ber-
bera, Boorama, Bur’o and Las Aanood). The interviews were held in urban settings with a 
variety of interlocutors ranging from local and international NGO-personnel to local Soma-
liland government officials, politicians, civil servants, academics, women’s organisations, 
private sector actors, religious leaders, ‘traditional’ elders, former SNM guerilla and jour-
nalists . The information gathered during these instances of qualitative research was inte-
grated with a thourough review of sparse local written sources (newspaper archives) and 
so-called ‘grey’ literature, for example the field reports of NGOs, United Nations and other 
agencies working in the Somaliland region during and after the Somali civil war of the 
1990s.  
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informal and the formal sphere are not fixed. It will be shown that in the case 
of Somaliland, setting or shifting borders between formal and informal 
spheres has been an instrument in the struggle for political power and con-
trol, which has led to the emergence of the institutional and political make- 
up of the Somaliland Republic as it stands today. Taking this into account, it 
(nevertheless) becomes clear that the scope for straightforward instrumen-
talisation of ‘informal’ institutions as tools to fix failed states is limited. In 
contrast to tools, informal institutions as such can not be readily manipu-
lated. Neither should international policymakers hope to avoid the inher-
ently messy political nature of state-building or institution-building by pre-
senting it as a technical fix. 
In the following I shall outline how clan-elders and institutions became 
involved in the process of political reconstruction leading to the establish-
ment of Somaliland as a ‘hybrid’ state. Then I present an analysis of its evolu-
tion to a ‘constitutional democracy’ against the background of local political 
competition and nascent Somaliland nationalism. Finally I shall discuss the 
nature of the Somaliland state today as well the relevance of the Somaliland 
case for future policy. 
State-making under a tree: Somaliland as a modern-traditional ‘hybrid’ 
Somewhat ironically perhaps, the origins of the Somali clan institutions 
which became a contributing factor to Somaliland’s state-building are pro-
foundly connected to the context of statelessness of the pre-colonial era. The 
Somali political system was adapted to a thinly populated region inhabited 
by a dispersed nomadic people, who did not sustain central governance. Re-
lations between roaming nomadic families which were part of larger descent 
groups (clans) were regulated via heer4. As Somali traditional law, or in fact 
Somali ‘social contract’, heer constitutes unwritten sets of essentially ‘private’ 
laws governing the relationship between particular descent groups: in the 
absence of a higher authority able to enforce laws. All matters between de-
scent groups or groups are subject to agreement, contract and compensation5. 
                                            
4 In Somali ortography, heer is actually spelled as xeer, with x representing a voiceless pha-
ryngeal fricative – like an aspirated ‘h’ involving a forced depression of the back of the 
tongue together with tightening of the throat. In this article, xeer will be written as heer, so 
as to avoid burdening the reader with unfamiliar ortography. 
5 On the role of heer as a vital aspect of Somali social order see notably Lewis 1961/1999. 
More recently Jama in 2007 has once more emphasised heer as the foundation of the Somali 
kinship or ‘clan’ system. In Jama’s view the Somali clan system became meaningless as a 
source of public order upon the destruction of heer by colonialism, military rule and civil 
war. In other words: without the functioning heer, kinship degenerates into brutal clan poli-
tics and violence. 
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Liability is collective. For example, if a man kills another man, the descent 
group of the killer is supposed to compensate the descent group of the victim 
for their loss or to face retaliation from the victim’s group. The usual price for 
an adult man is 100 camels or its equivalent in cash. Similar laws and prece-
dents exist for incidents of theft, rape, access to pasture and so on. Heer is 
made, applied and transmitted by the clan elders, i.e. the clan’s adult mar-
ried men who decide on an egalitarian basis and are collectively responsible 
for the affairs regarding their descent group6. I.M. Lewis, the British anthro-
pologist whose 1961 work on the Northwestern Somali still massively im-
pacts on current analyses of Somali politics, affectionately called this stateless 
form of governance ‘a pastoral democracy’ (Lewis 1961/1999). Somali inde-
pendence in 1960 signalled the inception of formal state structures resulting 
in the informalisation of the ‘traditional’ institutions associated with the So-
mali clan system. Subsequently, the military regime installed by the 1969 
military coup led by General Siyyad Barre formally (yet unsuccessfully) out-
lawed ‘traditional’ clan institutions and even clan allegiance as such, arguing 
that modernisation and development required national unity. 
What happened after the collapse of the Somali state apparatus in 1991? 
How did the clan elders re-appear so prominently on the political stage in 
the Northwest? Obviously, state collapse did not imply a simple return to the 
pre-colonial situation, as if the entire post-colonial political development was 
somehow deleted. Neither did the clan elders re-appear ‘out of the blue’, 
spontaneously taking charge of political affairs and governance when the 
state collapsed. The way for their involvement had been paved long before 
the actual state collapse, notably during the first decade of the Somali Civil 
War, beginning in the early 1980s. The northwestern region became one of 
the first theatres of conflict in the war. For several years government troops 
loyal to General Siyyad Barre’s military junta were pitted against the militia 
of the Somali National Movement (SNM). The SNM guerilla movement 
started in 1981 as a reaction against the perceived power concentration of the 
                                            
6 While the Somali are almost univerdally Muslim, heer has been in important respects at 
variance with Islamic shari’a. The Somali adopted an Islam that was adapted to their social 
system. Islamic institutions have been interpreted in the light of the existing clan structure. 
This is reflected in the Somali interpretation of Islamic legal sources. As pointed out by 
Lewis (1955), the Shari’a originated in a theocracy which had transcended the clan system. 
The elaboration of the Shari’a always referred to the concept of citizenship of a Muslim 
state. Such a state would be able to execute Islamic law as a neutral party responsible for 
maintaining order. In a case of homicide, the perpetrator is individually held responsible 
and condemmned to death. The Somali case was different. In the Somali interpretation of 
the Shari’a the sectors which elaborate a corpus of private and public law based on citizen-
ship were largely disregarded, as no state or indeed any other overarching structure ex-
isted. Therefore a murderer would (or indeed could) not be condemmned to death: the clan 
of the perpetrator takes collective responsibility. 
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Barre regime, which allegedly excluded politicians, military officers and 
businessmen of the Northwestern Isaaq. SNM had been instigated by disen-
franchised Isaaq cadres in the Diaspora. In order for them to stand a realistic 
chance of winning their guerilla war, they needed local support within 
Northwestern Somalia itself7. SNM’s leadership actively sought the en-
dorsement of the Isaaq clan elders inside Somalia (Prunier 1990: 113). In re-
turn for their moral, logistical and military support the clan elders were 
given a voice in the movement. From then on SNM’s administrative struc-
tures would include an advisory body of clan elders, representing the vari-
ous sub-clans of the Isaaq. The body was called the ‘Guurti’ and its members 
were self-selected. Technically, they were just ‘elders’, yet interviewees 
tended to refer to them as ‘politically active clan elders’, pointing to the fact 
that these elders involved themselves with matters superseding ‘traditional’ 
clan affairs. Because of the existence of a modern organisation such as SNM, 
drawing exclusively on Isaaq fighting power, these elders had become in-
volved with Isaaq-wide politics rather than with ‘traditional’ clan affairs 
conducted at a grassroots level of political aggregation8. 
In the field, the support for SNM became near-universal, especially after 
Siyyad Barre’s air bombardment of the Northwestern cities Hargeysa and 
Bur’o in 1988. The Isaaq clan elders on the ground became deeply involved 
and actively participated in the war against government troops and their 
‘auxiliaries’, makeshift militia from the Dulbahante, Warsangeli and Gad-
abuursi clans (Prunier 1990 : 116). As a result of their contributions to the war 
effort, the political weight of the elders in the field and in the SNM Guurti 
markedly increased. So did the weight of ‘traditional’ clan leadership and in-
stitutions. Upon the collapse of the military regime in 1991, the clan elders 
took a clear position confronting the SNM leadership. The SNM Guurti sup-
ported the rank-and-file guerilla fighters who had fought under the SNM 
banner in their bid to force SNM’s politicians to abandon their claims on a 
share in the new Somali national government to be formed in Mogadishu. 
Somaliland was proclaimed independent (Bryden 2003). Moreover, the in-
                                            
7 As pointed out by Compagnon (1992) during most of the 1980s the SNM guerilla had little 
connection with the population in the Northwest, Isaaq or other. The movement operated 
from Ethiopia, with support of the Mengistu government. The switch of tactics came about 
in March 1988 when a peace deal between Somalia and Ethiopia ended Ethiopian support 
for the SNM. In a desperate move SNM left its Ethiopian bases, launching a massive attack 
on Somali government troops in the Northwest. Mogadishu responded with merciless re-
taliation, razing the cities of Bur’o and Hargeysa, causing death and destruction among the 
Isaaq population (see below). Devoid of its Ethiopian refuge and (modest financial) sup-
port, SNM resorted to the material support of the Isaaq clan elders who provided fighting 
power and rations. 
8 Interview Abdi Yusuf Duaale ‘Boobe’ 16.04.03; Mohamed Haashi Elmi 15.04.03; Mohamed 
Ibrahim Warsaame ‘Hadraawi’ 16.04.03. 
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creased political weight of traditional clan leadership and institutions al-
lowed for a swift return to peace in the Northwest. The Dulbahante, Warsan-
geli and Gadabuursi, whose clan-based militia groups had fought alongside 
Barre’s army, had lost the war. Yet, thanks to the involvement of Isaaq clan 
elders and institutions in the war and in SNM, it was possible to approach 
the parties who had lost in a particular manner. Rather than approaching 
each other as political competitors, the former adversaries approached each 
other via traditional institutions - as clans (Farah and Lewis 1993). 
The elders of the respective sides dealt with death, injuries or lootings via 
negotiation and reconciliation mechanisms according to heer, Somali tradi-
tional law. In some cases the traditional peace making meetings were a mat-
ter of clan elders sitting under a tree hammering out a peace deal between 
two pastoral groups. In other cases traditional peace-making was raised to a 
clan-wide and region-wide reach: in these cases, the negotiators were not ex-
clusively elders from a traditional pastoral background; they were usually 
‘politically active elders’ and urban power brokers with modern occupations 
– former civil servants, businessmen, intellectuals, military men or politicians 
(Bradbury 1996). Referring back to heer and traditional institutions, however, 
allowed the negotiators of the involved clans to restore relations and to settle 
war damages, without having to resort to formal courts, war tribunals or 
other instruments for restorative justice that did not exist. The involvement 
of ‘modern’ political and economic actors in the ‘traditional’ peace-making 
process was in fact a prelude to the celebrated ‘hybridity’ of the new political 
system that would be born out of it. Thanks to the particularity of that proc-
ess, however, none of the former enemies had to lose face and large scale 
fighting between SNM and non-SNM clan-militia ceased. A portion of the 
political leaders of the non-SNM clans even appeared to subscribe to Somali-
land as a political entity – their representatives were incorporated in the new 
Somaliland government.9 
Once more, ‘politically active’ clan elders played a pivotal part in the 
episode that followed. The new SNM-led Somaliland government failed to 
establish control. It succumbed to an internal power struggle among compet-
ing political actors within the Isaaq over the control of Berbera seaport, a 
strategic economic asset, vital for government income. What had started as a 
political conflict between various groups of SNM cadres (politicians as well 
as military commanders) degraded into an armed fight among the militia of 
their respective clans. The war, which signalled the end of the SNM govern-
ment and SNM altogether, was ended by the intervention of the elders. The 
Gadabuursi elders convinced the Isaaq elders to start negotiating amongst 
themselves in order to broker a cease fire (Farah and Lewis 1993). The Isaaq 
                                            
9 Interview Abdi Yusuf Duaale ‘Boobe’ 16.04.03. 
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elders eventually obliged. Subsequently, the Guurti of the now defunct SNM 
jumped into the political vacuum. It took over the political initiative and 
called a national conference of Somaliland clan elders and representatives in 
Boorama, a Gadabuursi market town. 
The conference was held in Boorama on the invitation of the Gadabuursi 
elders who had mediated in the intra-Isaaq conflict. According to custom, the 
community hosting a clan meeting has to facilitate it and has to provide 
housing and catering for the attending elders. Local Gadabuursi businessmen 
footed a substantial part of the bill for the conference which ended up lasting 
six months, from January to May 2003. The delegates gathered under trees in 
the vicinity of the main conference venue and discussed whatever issues they 
had with each other – as would happen when holding a number of parallel 
‘traditional’ clan meetings. Yet, while the form of the conference was ‘tradi-
tional’, the substance was indisputably innovative. While normally clan 
meetings would take place on much lower levels of political aggregation (i.e. 
descent groups or sub-clan groups), this was the first time ever that a clan 
conference took place on a ‘national’ scale, bringing together delegates (‘tra-
ditional’ elders as well as power brokers such as politicians, military men, 
etc.) of the different clan families. They were assisted in their work by 
younger professional clansmen to do the administration, to take minutes or 
to prepare meetings. Rather than being formally mandated by their clans, the 
delegates were self-selected, with the clan elders sitting on the Guurti in con-
trol of the process (Fadal 1996 and interview Mohamed Ibrahim Warsaame 
‘Hadraawi’ 16.04.03). 
Organising and overseeing the negotiations between political players 
within a ‘traditional’ framework (that of a clan conference), allowed the eld-
ers on the Guurti, who had filled the power vacuum after the demise of the 
SNM, to keep on top of the process. They succeeded in formalising their po-
litical and institutional role in what was celebrated as a ‘hybrid’ political con-
struction. The Boorama delegates agreed to the introduction of a ‘hybrid’ 
presidential system with a bi-cameral parliament, the latter of which con-
sisted of a house of representatives and a house of elders, or Guurti. Mem-
bers of both houses were appointed through their clan’s political channels 
and subject to their clan’s fluctuating political dynamics. The new political 
system featured the Guurti as the highest organ of the state, the final arbiter 
in institutional and political conflicts (SAPD 2002). The new president elected 
by the conference delegates was Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, a veteran Isaaq 
politician. Egal had been a former prime minister under the 1960s civil re-
gime. Deposed by Siyyad Barre’s military coup, he spent some time in 
prison, but was later rehabilitated as Somalia’s ambassador to India. Egal 
had a good reputation and stature as an elder statesman. It was hoped that 
this would enhance Somaliland’s position in the Horn. Even more impor-
tantly, Egal had never been involved in the SNM, nor had he been party to 
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any of its politico-military factions fighting for political power in Somaliland. 
The elders of the Guurti considered him a trustworthy partner (ICG 2003, 
and interview Mohamed Rashid Sheikh Hassan 03.04.03). Little did they an-
ticipate the impact the new president was going to have on the political posi-
tion of the Guurti and the Somaliland clan elders in general. 
 
 
Claims to ‘modern’ statehood: the hybrid recaptured 
 
In the hybrid state Somaliland had become, the Guurti was invested as the ul-
timate peace keeper in the country. Moreover, as a chamber with legislative 
power, it was part of the national government. The Boorama conference had 
been the elders’ moment de gloire and the apex of their political power. It is in-
teresting, however, that the particular institutional arrangement that resulted 
from Boorama, seems to have contributed to their gradual but irreversible 
political displacement as independent, pivotal political actors. Under the ae-
gis of the Guurti, the 1993 Boorama Conference laid Somaliland’s new insti-
tutional foundations and settled issues concerning the division of power be-
tween competing political factions. The outcome of the Boorama conference 
was promising: a wide consensus was reached and Somaliland now seemed 
ready for take-off. Arguably, Boorama signalled the birth of something like a 
Somaliland consciousness, some kind of national identity and a sense of 
statehood, at least among the Isaaq and the Gadabuursi. The Gadabuursi 
elders had been intensely involved in forging a political compromise be-
tween competing Isaaq politicians and their respective clan constituencies. 
By saving Somaliland from civil war, the Gadabuursi gained a more impor-
tant stake in it. Consequently, Somaliland could no longer be perceived as a 
merely Isaaq-driven political entity. While the Boorama Conference was go-
ing on, nascent ‘Somaliland consciousness’ was further enhanced by the pro-
jected deployment of 28.000 troops by UNOSOM II in a bid to pacify and re-
unite Somalia (Indian Ocean Newsletter 13.03.1993)10. The idea of foreign 
troop deployment on Somaliland soil, let alone re-unification with the South 
was resented by most Somaliland political actors involved at Boorama. This 
embryonic popular sense of nationhood and more importantly, statehood, 
was masterfully nurtured and instumentalised by Egal. 
                                            
10  The projected troop deployment did not materialise. The interventions of the UNOSOM 
II political office did however, result in the breaking up of a number of peace conferences in 
what Somaliland claimed as its easternmost provinces, Sool and Sanaag. For detailed analy-
sis of the UN operation concerned see: Shahnoun M. 1994: Somalia: the missed opportuni-
ties, African Rights 1993: Somalia. Operation Restore Hope: a preliminary assessment and 
Somalia News Update newsletter vol. 3, n. 22. (August 1994). 
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President Egal immediately consolidated his position by mobilising a 
critical amount of financial resources. Working through his own Habar Awal 
sub-clan of the Isaaq, he secured a loan of 3 million USD from Somaliland 
businessmen based in Djibouti. The club of businessmen consisted of about 
10 big traders, some of whom had been present for a long time on the Soma-
liland market, where they were mainly involved in foodstuff and cigarette 
imports and in hide and skin exports. Others had joined the market after the 
Boorama Conference in 1993. Except for two of them, the traders were all 
Habar Awal. In return for the loan, the traders would be granted a tax break 
for imports into Somaliland via the port of Berbera, which was controlled 
and managed by Egal’s own Habar Awal clansmen (Marchal 1996 : 75). With 
the loan, Egal paid for the demobilisation of SNM militia, as well as for the 
personnel of the new Somaliland government and administration – all of 
whom were entitled to a salary. With a further financial input from the Ha-
bar Awal traders, he introduced a new currency, the Somaliland shilling, 
which replaced the Somali shilling as legal tender. For both parties this was a 
hugely profitable move, financially as well as symbolically (De Waal 1996; 
Africa Confidential 31.03.1995). 
Almost immediately, Egal’s position was challenged by competing ac-
tors from the Habar Yunis sub-clan of the Isaaq, who felt politically and eco-
nomically disenfranchised. A fresh armed conflict ensued. Egal, however, 
proved able to hold his ground and was even able to strengthen his position, 
politically as well as institutionally, drawing on superior financial resources, 
Somaliland nationalism, a statist discourse and clan politics. Predictably, 
during the conflict, fighting took place. Some of it involved Habar Yunis mi-
litia, fighting government regulars aided by Habar Jallo militia. Fighting also 
took place between Habar Yunis and Habar Jallo militia as such. Militia of 
other Isaaq clans were involved in the war as well. Yet, the fighting did not 
totally paralyze the country or the state’s institutions. Egal was in control at 
all times, embodying the realm of the state founded by the representatives of 
the Somaliland clans. To be sure, Egal took care to keep balancing and work-
ing politics through clan channels, but he was able to do so on his own terms. 
The clan elders had become all but sidelined. While during the previous con-
flict the elders of the Guurti had played a crucial role in peace-making and 
power-brokering between competing political factions, now they had lost the 
political initiative. They were part of the government, Egal’s government, 
and as such considered partisan (Bryden 1994). 
As the war between competing politicians fizzled out after two years or 
so, clan elders on the ground started negotiations amongst each other, out-
side the realm of the state or the political competition over state control. As 
had been the case in the former episode, clan elders successfully brokered a 
ceasefire and war reparations between the clans of the militia fighting on ei-
ther side of the political conflict. As the process gradually approached the 
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next level of negotiations – those about inclusiveness of government and po-
litical power sharing, Egal broke in on it. He had the clan elders of his Habar 
Awal sub-clan stop their participation in the process and offered political 
posts and spoils to Habar Yunis opposition politicians, who in their turn then 
disregarded the participation in any political negotiations of their own clans’ 
elders. In order to formalise and consolidate the result of these negotiations, 
Egal had his Guurti organised a clan conference at the Somaliland capital 
Hargeysa, modelled after the one in Boorama. It was nothing like it, how-
ever. The conference was carefully engineered and fully under the control of 
the power circle around the president, now including his previous Habar 
Yunis opposition figureheads. Delegates of the different clans were hand 
picked in order to deliver the desired outcome, a new government as precon-
ceived by Egal and his former competitors. From then on it was the govern-
ment, not clan elders or politically active elders who regulated clan represen-
tation (SAPD 2002; interviews Ali Dirriye Jama ‘Mudubbe’ 06.04.03; Abdil-
lahi Mohamed Ahmed ‘Filter’ 07.04.03; Suleiman Awood Jama 06.04.03). 
Moreover, the 1997 Hargeysa conference signalled the end of clan-based 
representation in the Houses of Parliament. It was decided to introduce – in 
due course – a multi-party system. The idea as such was generally accepted 
among urban populations, politicians, civil servants and intellectuals. How-
ever useful the clan based representation system had been immediately after 
state collapse, and however commendable the role of the clan elders, the 
‘traditional’ system was not suited to deliver proper governance and devel-
opment. The elders could keep or make peace in case of conflict, but their 
role remained short of the level of leadership and administration needed to 
make laws and enforce them, to make policy or to provide services to the 
population such as health and education. This was what was expected of the 
state, not only by the educated elite, but also by the population at large11. 
(The state was supposed to provide.) Last but not least: the only instance in 
which Somaliland would stand a chance of winning international recognition 
(and international financial aid) would be if it presented itself as a modern 
state with a democratic system of government. Egal sensed this very well. 
Surfing on the nationalist sentiment and the popular concern for interna-
tional recognition, he expanded the realm of the state-moving to bring local 
governance and taxation controlled by the clan elders under government 
control. At the same time, some tasks which are generally considered as cru-
cial attributes of statehood remained ‘outsourced’ to the clan elders outside 
the state realm. 
                                            
11 Interview Mohamed Ahmed ‘Silaanyo’ 05.06.02 
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Drawing and shifting borders  
 
After the Somali state’s collapse in 1991, elders in various regions started to 
develop initiatives in the sphere of governance and service provision. In 
Boorama for example a so-called ‘social committee of elders’ dealt with local 
governance issues. It helped in the administration of the town and the sur-
rounding areas, overseeing peacekeeping as well as local development. In 
conjunction with local businessmen, administrators, intellectuals and local 
professionals, it determined development priorities for the region and regu-
lated relations with external interveners, such as international NGOs. The 
relatively safe and regulated environment provided by what Menkhaus has 
called the ‘civic coalition’ resulted in enthusiastic participation on the part of 
the international NGOs, which kept expanding their activities in the region 
(Menkhaus 1997 : 35). After the installation of a Mayor and the governor in 
Boorama in 1993, the social committee of elders functioned as a semi-official 
city-council to the mayor. Following the 1997 Hargeysa conference, however, 
this changed. The central government blocked the elders’ initiatives and 
made it clear to all concerned that it was the state administration that was the 
relevant authority to deal with. The international agencies were requested to 
shift their offices to Hargeysa or to face expulsion. In addition to the offices, 
the Boorama regional economy lost local jobs and other benefits as well as 
the leverage to generate its own income and to determine its own spending 
priorities12. Moreover, as from 2000, Hargeysa curbed taxation by municipal 
authorities, increasing Boorama’s (as well as other municipalities’) financial 
dependence on the central government13. Local authorities appointed by the 
central government stopped soliciting the advice of the social committee, 
which lost its leverage and eventually disappeared. 
In the sphere of public order however, it appeared evident that neither 
the government, nor the administration, nor the police or any other state in-
stitution was in control. The state (embodied by its institutions and officials) 
did not have the monopoly over legitimate violence. It was unable to main-
tain public order without the help of the local clan elders on the ground and 
had to depend on local security arrangements. In Bur’o, for example, the po-
lice force left disputes between local clansmen to a body of elders called the 
‘Peace Committee’. It settled disputes according to heer and functioned on an 
ad-hoc basis without fixed membership or a set number of members. It was 
composed in accordance with the specific needs of each particular case. As 
for its status, I was told that the Peace Committee was a ‘tribal’ institution, 
                                            
12 Interview Abdirahmaan Jim’aale ‘Dherre’ 20.03.03 and Mohamed Muse Bahdoon 
23.03.03. 
13 Law n° 12 on the United Tariffs for Local Government (effective from 15 April 2000). 
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which was recognised by the government. Moreover, the Regional Governor 
often seems to have been part of it as one of the elders14. The role of the po-
lice was apparently limited to assisting the elders involved in resolving the 
conflict. Moreover, ‘formal’ state institutions involved in law enforcement as 
such functioned in a particular way. At Bur’o municipality a set of officials 
including the local police commander and the commander of the local custo-
dian corps explained their role to me as follows. Allegedly, theft and other 
petty crimes were, in principle, handled by the police and the lower courts of 
Somaliland’s formal justice system. A murder case, however, was automati-
cally a matter for the elders of the involved parties. According to the officials, 
murderers were caught by the police, sent down to court, convicted and 
jailed. Then, the government called the families to negotiate. When an 
agreement was reached, blood money was paid and the sentence was ‘re-
duced’, referring to the fact that the perpetrator was in fact released15. The 
impact of the elders (and of Somali ‘traditional’ law, heer), however, ex-
tended far beyond murder cases. It appears that settlements were reached 
out of court in most instances involving conflicts between civilians such as 
land issues, theft or assault. Reportedly, the formal justice system was com-
pelled to condone or even ratify any decision taken by the elders for fear of 
(otherwise) triggering uncontrollable violence, thus undermining the existing 
fragile stability (SAPD 2002b). Even relations and conflicts between state 
agents acting in their official capacity and civilians – for example when a po-
liceman shot someone in the context of a police operation – were subject to 
heer. 
The apparently complete overlap of the activities of formal and informal 
agents in the sphere of public order, and the fact that conflicts were proc-
essed via the ‘traditional’ system, however, did not hinder the shift of real 
political control from elders to the political class. On the contrary, outsourc-
ing security was functional and served the purposes of those in control of the 
state apparatus. Rather than limiting their leverage, it expanded it even fur-
ther. (In a context where the political and military balance between clans [as 
well as the perception of that balance] is very important and has a potential 
impact on the national political level, the political stakes in a conflict can be-
come very high.) Government agents and officials were in a position to take 
part in informal ‘traditional’ proceedings as elders. At the same time how-
ever, they were still government agents with a position they owed to the po-
litical patrons who appointed them. By means of the resulting loyalties the 
political patrons exercised control over the process. In other words, in cases 
                                            
14 Interviews Ali Diriye Jama ‘Mudubbe’ and Suleiman Awood Jama 06.04.03; Ibrahim 
Ayaanle Mirre 05.04.03; Haroon Yusuf 08.07.02; Aden Yusuf Abokor 08.07.02. 
15 interviews Jama Ahmed Kodah and Suleiman Muse Hassan 12.06.02. 
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where the political stakes were high, there was a form of direct political con-
trol, exercised by the political actors who controlled the state apparatus, al-
lowed by the elusive borders between the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ sphere. 
The more centralised, the less participatory Somaliland became. The 
government, controlled by the president, increased its leverage and political 
power to the detriment of decentralised, governance structures and proc-
esses steered by informal leaders and institutions associated with the clan 
system. To be sure, clan and clan leaders/power brokers remained highly 
relevant. The increased economic leverage allowed the government to fur-
ther expand its control by expanding the scope of patronage and clientelism. 
President Egal masterfully played the strategic game of giving and taking 
spoils and benefits to clan powerbrokers in the capital Hargeysa and the re-
gions, while maintaining the power balance between them and keeping them 
loyal to him. The centre of power of the Somaliland heartland was Hargeysa. 
Despite the persistence of clan politics, the relevant players were now not the 
clan elders but the politicians. 
This trend was continued after 2001, when the constitutional referen-
dum abolished the clan-representation system and introduced the multi-
party system and universal suffrage. The constitution had won overwhelm-
ing approval, yet, as pointed out by ICG (2003), it was held in the midst of a 
popular Somaliland nationalist frenzy and the approval rates were mainly 
due to article 1 of the draft, which re-affirmed the Somaliland independence. 
It was a matter of controversy, however, that the number of political parties 
to be registered under the multi-party system was limited to three, a measure 
proposed in order to prevent parties from drawing exclusive support from 
particular ‘tribal’ (clan) or religious constituencies. Egal died before the first 
actual election (on the municipal level), which was held in the autumn of 
2002 and won by the government party UDUB. Meanwhile Egal had been 
succeeded by his Gadabuursi vice-president Dahir Rayaale Kahin who subse-
quently successfully contested the 2003 presidential election at the head of 
that same government party. The presidential election had been considered 
reasonably free and fair by domestic as well as foreign observers (Lindeman, 
B./Hansen, S.J. 2003). Yet, Kahin, a former high-ranking officer in Siyyad 
Barre’s National Security Service (NSS), promptly started recruiting former 
NSS colleagues as his advisors and in lower ranking administrative functions. 
Soon, the president was accused of displaying disrespect for due process and 
for the Somaliland constitution, organising and expanding his own secret ser-
vice outside any legal framework and beyond public oversight (ICG 2003 : 33). 
Kahin continued to rely on the government clique’s patronage network 
which extended far into the social fabric of Somaliland’s ‘traditional’ clan 
structure. However, the coercive power of the government became ever more 
tangible. While under Egal the government had to tread carefully when tak-
ing on its political adversaries, for fear of antagonising their clan constituen-
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cies, under Kahin political arrests became possible. In January 2007 three 
journalists of Haatuf/Somaliland Times Newspaper were arrested without 
warrant and detained incommunicado in prison. Reportedly, the reason for 
their arrest was Haatuf’s publication of a series of articles alleging corruption 
on the part of the president as well as his wife Huda Barkhad.16 They were 
tried under the old Somali Penal Code and convicted to two years and five 
months imprisonment plus a fine for ‘reporting false information about the 
government, discrediting the President and his family and creating inter-
communal tension’. All local and international protests were of no avail. The 
men were only released after a presidential pardon, implying that they re-
mained guilty (Afrol 29.03.2007)17. Four days before the presidential pardon 
for the journalists, according to a report of the Somaliland National Human 
Rights Network, security forces cracked down on a protest of meat traders in 
Bur’o who were demonstrating against a doubling of the city’s abattoir fees. 
Armed police stormed the building and arrested the protesters. The same 
day, they were sentenced to six months in jail by the regional security com-
mittee, an extra-legal body controlled by the president’s security service. The 
number of reports of similar incidents is increasing steadily. At the time of 
writing this article, September 2007, the Hargeysa Regional Court had con-
victed three prominent Somaliland politicians (including one of Rayaale’s 
former ministers) to a prison sentence of three years and nine months for il-
legally forming a political party, engaging in unauthorized political activities 
and putting the good name of the head of state in disrepute (Somaliland 
Times 270, 24.03.2007). 
While under Egal the Guurti still had sufficient leverage left to mediate 
in instances of conflict between the government and its opposition, this is 
less the case today. As the ‘upper house’ of the bi-cameral parliament, the 
Guurti’s status was an issue of debate when the multi-party system was in-
troduced. As a house of clan elders, it could hardly be subject to a popular 
election by universal suffrage. Or could it? The 2005 parliamentary election 
proceeded without tackling that thorny question, which the Guurti members 
in fact refused to discuss or consider. As a result the parliamentary election 
only regarded the lower house, the House of Representatives. Thus by at-
tempting to extend its own shelf life, the Guurti considerably undermined its 
own standing as the  
‘unique institution that had been at the heart of clan-based power-sharing 
and consensual politics in Somaliland, linking modern political institutions 
to traditional political organization and, by extension, inter-communal poli-
tics to national politics’ (Kibble 2006).  
                                            
16 Amnesty International Urgent Action Appeal 26/07 dated 2 February 2007. 
17 Afrol news 29 march 2007, http://www.afrol.com/articles/24919. 
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President Rayaale has unilaterally (and illegally) extended the Guurti’s man-
date in March 2006 (Kibble, S./Abokor, A. 2007). Since the parliamentary 
election, overt criticism levelled at the current political class is mounting. 
Government and opposition politicians are increasingly mistrusted as mutu-
ally interchangeable, self-serving, corrupt and unscrupulously using clan 
politics to achieve their goals. The use of clan politics affects relations be-
tween the communities belonging to those different clans inside as well as 
outside the capital Hargeysa. It is bound to affect – in some way or another – 
the capacity of local clan elders to make and keep peace as well. The con-
tainment of political competition is no longer the business of the clan elders 
or the Guurti. Interestingly, in a number of cases that role seems to have been 
duly assumed by prominent members of Hargeysa’s civil society (e.g. mem-
bers of think tanks and NGOs or individual intellectuals and religious lead-
ers) forming ad-hoc committees mediating between the concerned stake-
holders in a political conflict18. It is they who now seem to represent Somali-
land’s hope for peace as well as governmental legitimacy and accountability. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Looking at Somaliland one can not help being amazed by the dynamics and 
the complexity of the coming into being of this polity. Somaliland is the re-
sult of a political process extending beyond its 17-year-old existence. In that 
political process, setting or shifting borders between formal and informal 
spheres has been an instrument in the struggle for political power and con-
trol. What has happened? ‘Traditional’ clan leaders and institutions provided 
the necessary political and institutional bypass to allow Northwestern politi-
cians and strong-holders from the former regime to establish or re-establish 
control as governors and administrators of a new polity while enjoying the 
necessary legitimacy and resources to that effect. The claim to formal state-
hood, allowed these politicians to eventually push community leaders (clan 
elders), who had done their share in building the polity in the first place, 
from the ‘negotiation table’, while keeping their assistance at hand for tasks 
strongly associated with state monopolies, for example, maintenance of pub-
lic order. 
Somaliland nationalism, born in the civil war against Siyyad Barre, was 
real. The local conviction that Somaliland was a state and that it should be 
recognized as such was real. It helped sustain legitimise President Egal’s 
claim on selected typical attributes of statehood such as the establishment of 
                                            
18 See the article in Somaliland Times 292, 25.08.2007 ‘Somaliland Mediators end govern-
ment and parliament deadlock’ for a recent instance of this kind of mediation. 
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government institutions and agencies, taxation (however symbolical) or a na-
tional currency. Control over these selected attributes allowed Egal to recap-
ture the pivotal place in politics. The Somaliland clan elders were (out of ne-
cessity) allowed to borrow from SNM politicians during and just after the 
war with Siyyad Barre. Egal successfully manipulated notions of the formal 
and the informal to bring the elders back under control, thus consolidating 
his position. Egal’s successor Rayaale completed the process. Many North-
western pre-civil war politicians, who had made a career in Mogadishu, are 
back in power – albeit on a smaller turf than before. 
In conclusion: what is the contribution of the factor ‘traditional’ institu-
tions to state-building? Do they guarantee more legitimate, accountable and 
effective governance? It is not quite as simple as that. The Somaliland experi-
ence seems a far cry from the somewhat romantic idea of simply instumen-
talising informal traditional institutions as a kind of ‘appropriate governance 
technology’ solution for problematic statehood in Africa. In fact, Somaliland, 
as a result of a process involving ‘traditional’ leadership and institutions, 
could be considered as a (case of successful reconstruction of political ar-
rangements amounting to a) neo-patrimonial system in the sense of Chabal 
and Daloz (1999). So, are informal institutions indeed detrimental to legiti-
mate, accountable and effective governance? Are they indeed contributing to 
state failure rather than repairing it? As Meagher (2006) observed, it would 
be misguided to attribute political outcomes to assumed inherent characteris-
tics of African society, politics or culture – as if it would be impossible per se 
for Somali political actors to foster some form of functional and equitable 
governance. It is not. that Somaliland as it exists today is the result of a po-
litical process involving competition between political actors (from the ‘mod-
ern’ as well as ‘traditional’ spheres) who have operationalised and instumen-
talised notions of the formal and the informal or the ‘modern’ and the ‘tradi-
tional’ in that process. Taking this into account, as an external actor one can 
not avoid the ‘political’ by invoking the ‘traditional’. State building is a po-
litical process. At the same time one can not invoke the ‘traditional’ to ex-
plain the ‘political’. The destiny of the Somaliland polity is not predisposed. 
‘Informal’ or ‘traditional’ institutions are not inherently good or bad for po-
litical legitimacy, governance or the degree of popular participation in it. 
Progressive powers in Somaliland will have to take it from here, working for 
more legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness of government through 
and perhaps beyond the institutions currently at their disposal, be they for-
mal or informal. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Können informelle ‘traditionale’ Institutionen beim Aufbau stärker legiti-
mierter, berechenbarer und effizienter Staaten und Regierungsweisen helfen? 
Dieser Artikel soll zu dieser sich entwickelnden Diskussion beitragen, indem 
die Geschichte von ‘Somaliland’ aufgerollt wird, einer selbsterklärten unab-
hängigen Republik, die sich 1991 vom bürgerkriegsgeschüttelten Somalia 
trennte. Diese Sezession Somalilands erscheint durch ‘traditionale’ Clanäl-
teste betrieben worden zu sein. Diese Clanältesten waren auch für einige 
Schritte zur politischen Wiederversöhnung zwischen den Gruppen, die um 
Macht und Ressourcen in der Region kämpfen, verantwortlich. Das politi-
sche Gewicht dieser Clanältesten in der neuen Politik hat wichtige Auswir-
kungen für den institutionellen Aufbau. Somaliland begann als ein clanba-
siertes polit-institutionelles Arrangement, in dem die ‘traditionalen’ Clanäl-
testen eine wichtige Rolle spielten, allerdings in einem ‘modernen’ Rahmen – 
dem eines Staates. Dieser Artikel untersucht die Dynamik zwischen diesen 
‘modernen’ und ‘traditionalen’ Komponenten und der Entwicklung von der 
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Unabhängigkeitserklärung Somalilands im Jahr 1991 bis heute. Diskutiert 
werden Mittel und Wege, wie ‘moderne’ und ‘traditionale’ Institutionen und 
Personen koexistieren, überlappen und im Kontext des politischen Wettbe-
werbs im neu gegründeten ‘Staat’ neu erfunden werden. 
Schlüsselwörter 
Gesetz, Regulation, ökonomische Entwicklung, internationale Beziehungen, internationa-
le politische Ökonomie 
Résumé 
Les institutions informelles ‘traditionnelles’ peuvent-elles contribuer à la 
mise en place d’un Etat et d’une gouvernance plus légitimes, responsables et 
performants ? Cet article participe à cette discussion émergeante, en s’ap-
puyant sur l’histoire du Somaliland, une république indépendante autopro-
clamée qui se sépara en 1991 de la Somalie, alors en prise à une guerre civile. 
La sécession du Somaliland semble avoir été conduite par les chefs de clans 
‘traditionnels’. Ceux-ci furent également responsables de quelques avancées 
dans le domaine de la réconciliation politique entre les groupes qui se battai-
ent pour le contrôle du pouvoir et des ressources dans la région. Le poids po-
litique de ces chefs de clans eut des conséquences importantes pour la consti-
tution des institutions. Le Somaliland fut au départ un arrangement politico-
institutionnel basé sur les structures claniques au sein duquel les chefs ‘tradi-
tionnels’ jouèrent un rôle important, bien qu’agissant dans un cadre ‘mo-
derne’: celui de l’Etat. Cet article examine la dynamique développée entre ces 
composantes ‘modernes’  et ‘traditionnelles’  et l’évolution de la situation, de 
la déclaration d’indépendance du Somaliland en 1991 jusqu’à aujourd’hui. 
La manière dont le personnel politique et les institutions ‘modernes’  et ‘tra-
ditionnels’ , coexistent, se chevauchent et sont réinventés dans le contexte de 
compétition politique du nouvel Etat, est débattue dans cet article. 
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